

Zlatko Vujović
Daliborka Uljarević

Political crisis in Montenegro: Between Toward and Towards to solution

Political crisis in Montenegro: Between Toward and Towards to solution¹

Montenegro has been facing a deep political crisis for a longer period of time. The political crisis was marked by the boycott of Parliament by all opposition parties after the last parliamentary elections held in October 2016. Furthermore, there is no determination on either side to establish an open dialogue, in order to reach a consensus on the key issues of reforming electoral legislation and about the conditions for free and fair elections. The European Union, as well as the United States, are undertaking significant efforts to promote dialogue, encourage the opposition parties to return to Parliament, and call for the necessity of adopting the recommendations of the last OSCE/ODIHR mission.

There are two different approaches in the stakeholder community on how to solve the current crisis in Montenegro. One refers to the prompt adoption of OSCE/ODIHR recommendations before the presidential elections (toward²), and the other, which sees this as a window of opportunity for an inclusive process that would lead to a comprehensive reform of the electoral legal and institutional framework (towards³).

Both sides are seeking sustainable solutions, but have different approaches regarding the dynamics of the process. Are those those approaches conflicting, or could they maybe be seen as complementary? In this policy brief we will explain that they are indeed complementary.

Apart from the boycott of Parliament by all opposition parties, we see two additional issues, which are very important for further democratization of Montenegro and its path towards full membership of the EU.

The first issue is the attempt to take over the leadership and regain the majority in the RTCG Council by the ruling party. *The second one* is a strong smear campaign conducted by government-backed media to defame leading CSOs in Montenegro, as well as to pressure key donors not to fund those CSOs who are not loyal to the ruling coalition.

1 The meaning of both words is the same within the same context, but the meaning depends on whether the word is used as an adjective or a preposition. As an adjective, “toward(s)” means coming soon or happening at the moment. As a preposition, “toward(s)” can mean several different things depending on the context of its usage; it can mean in a certain direction, relating to, not long prior to or as providing help or assistance to accomplish something. Ultimately, different countries and types of English writers prefer one spelling over the other. Both spellings are equally correct.

2 As an adjective.

3 As a preposition.

Reaching consensus on electoral reform

Montenegro is facing a severe lack of public trust in state institutions, which is jeopardizing the overall trust in the integrity of the electoral process. The period after the last parliamentary elections is marked with series of actions that have additionally increased the gap between the ruling coalition and the opposition.

Montenegro is moving closer to the presidential elections which will be organized at the beginning of spring next year. The Delegation of EU to Montenegro is investing significant efforts to motivate the ruling and opposition parties to start activities that would lead to legal amendments based on OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. Those activities are encouraging dialogue, but there is hesitation on the side of the opposition, since the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations –if accepted only as a framework– could limit the possible outcomes of the process.

The parliamentary boycott by most opposition parties affects the image of Montenegro, and it further contributes to the increase of public distrust in the integrity of the electoral process. On the one hand, the boycott could be seen as a risk for political stability and the continuation of the EU accession process, while on the other hand, it could be also used as a window of opportunity for reforming the electoral legal and institutional framework in Montenegro. For the legal reform, a 2/3 majority of MPs is required for amendments to the Law on the Election of Councilors and Representatives (Electoral Law). This majority is extremely difficult to obtain, so that the current crisis could also be used as a potential chance for the more than necessary electoral reform.

OSCE/ODIHR conducted many missions in Montenegro, and their experts developed a number of good recommendations. Basically, those recommendations are acceptable for both sides. But it should be noted that those recommendations are often designed in a rather general and technical manner. Hence, there is a need for further debate and expert engagements. The process of electoral reform is time-consuming and requires considerable resources. Mistakes that might be made, could have a possibly long-term negative impact.

There is certain disagreement about whether this process should only involve ODIHR recommendations given in relation to presidential, or also for parliamentary, elections. ODIHR was observing the last presidential as well as last parliamentary elections, and published two separate EOM reports. Most recommendations regarding the presidential elections do not require 2/3 majority support in Parliament. Those that do require amendments to the Electoral Law, however, are neither supported by the government nor by the opposition, and they refer only to the change of the residential census⁴. Other recommendations from this report refer to issues that do

4 “Legal Framework

8. Consideration should be given to eliminating ambiguities in the electoral law to avoid differing interpretations and to clearly specify how the law applies in the context of a presidential election.
9. In line with previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations and international good practice, consideration could be given to eliminating the 24-month residency requirement to be eligible to vote.
10. Consideration should be given to significantly reducing the length of residency requirement to be eligible to stand as a candidate”.

not require amendments to the electoral law but other laws, or they relate to changes of the practices of state institutions.

The report on the parliamentary elections held in 2016, contains recommendations that are harder to achieve. ODIHR recommends a “*comprehensive electoral reform with the aim to harmonize election legislation internally and with other relevant laws. The reform process should be inclusive and completed well in advance of the next elections.*” ODIHR also recommends a reform of the electoral administration⁵, proposing the abolishment of voting rights to authorized representatives of political parties who have a status in state and municipal electoral commissions, equal to members including voting rights. Key ODIHR recommendations from the parliamentary elections includes amendments to the electoral law, which requires a 2/3 majority support in the Montenegrin Parliament.

Currently, the process of negotiation between the ruling coalition and the opposition is under pressure and question, owing to the opposition boycott, which even stop to be unified, and the short deadlines for the adoption of recommendations due to the upcoming presidential elections. There are quite low chances for the adoption of the recommendations before the presidential elections, and there are also no institutional guaranties that those newly adopted legal solutions would be respected.

In order to make the process more feasible we would like to propose a list of general process and recommendations for reform process. We believe that proposed recommendation can contribute to solving current political crisis in Montenegro.

Key risks:

1. Short period before the presidential elections;
2. Lack of readiness on behalf of the opposition parties to become involved in the process of adopting ODIHR recommendations;
3. Lack of readiness on behalf of the ruling party to widen the dialogue to include questions of institutional reform that should represent the pillars of not only rebuilding trust in the election process, but also in the overall reform of the society.

Recommendations:

1. Adoption of OSCE/ODIHR recommendations should be split in two phases. One referring to the presidential, and the second to the parliamentary elections;
2. Parliament, and other state institutions, should work on the adoption of the recommendations, which are not related to amending the Electoral Law that requires a 2/3 majority, thus meeting the deadlines for the presidential elections and creating conditions for their legitimacy;
3. The process of adopting ODIHR recommendations for parliamentary elections should focus on a comprehensive electoral reform including the reform of related laws and institutions; That reform should deal with regulations for conducting parliamentary and local elections;
4. However, electoral reform should be a product of a thorough and highly inclusive process that is followed not only by the work of representative of

⁵ Consideration could be given to clarifying the role of authorized representatives and limiting their direct involvement in the decision-making process.

the ruling and opposition parties, but also accompanied by various public debates, involvement of experts, civil society, as well as the general public. A working group should be formed and composed of all parliamentary parties and representatives of election monitoring organizations. The process should be conducted in the Parliament of Montenegro;

5. The process related to parliamentary elections should last from 6-12 months and be followed by strict guarantees for implementation, including a similar model as used for the “government of electoral trust”. Hence, parliamentary elections could be organized at the very beginning of 2019, in parallel with local elections in all municipalities, following the adoption of a new Law on the Election of Councilors and Representatives.
6. The negotiation process should also result in a reform of the State Election Commission: transformation of the SEC from the “party delegate” model to an institution composed of recognized professionals with international experience, as well as civil society representatives. Furthermore, the negotiation process should result in a new appointment of governing bodies of institutions that should be without political party influence, such as: Anti-corruption Agency (ASK), State Audit Institution (DRI), Ombudsman, Agency for Electronic Media;
7. The EU institutions, in particular, European Commission and European Parliament, should support efforts and activities of local CSOs, in order to enhance political dialogue, election reform and election monitoring.

Government-NGO relations hitting rock-bottom again

When it comes to democratic consolidation, Montenegro is facing regression at all levels – a decline of credibility in key institutions and actors of representative democracy, with a parallel strengthening of influence of non-formal centres of power, and a limitation of the development of civic culture. As regards the limitation of the development of civic culture, the backsliding in relations between government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as the most active part of the civil society, is of great concern, accompanied by continuous and serious pressure being exercised on NGOs with a critical voice.

NGOs in Montenegro have a rather unusual position compared to the rest of the region. Namely, in its short but accelerating history of development, they have reached an important position as one of the major social players active in most diverse fields of public interest. A position which is additionally strengthened by a rather respectful, positive perception of citizens towards NGOs⁶. This especially refers to the influential core of well-established, organizationally more developed NGOs operating on national level, dominantly focused on raising awareness, advocacy and research on human rights, good governance, fight against corruption and other issues closely re-

6 Half of Montenegrin citizens believe that most NGOs aim to improve the general situation and wellbeing of the country, and 47% citizens trust NGOs, with 37% respondents considering NGOs as an important player in monitoring and watchdog of the work of Government, IPSOS and CRNVO survey, from November 2015.

lated to some of the key obligations deriving from the EU integration and accession process. At the rhetorical level, the authorities keep underlining the importance of NGOs, being aware that that is a politically correct approach. However, in practice, the space for effective contribution on part of the genuinely independent and critically oriented NGOs is becoming more and more limited, and sometimes even marked by turbulent public confrontations.

Not so long ago, considerable progress had been made in Montenegro in this respect. Namely, two government decrees, one concerning procedures for holding public debates and another one regulating procedures for cooperation between public administration bodies and NGOs, entered into force in February 2012. Those were supposed to be important channels of NGO influence shaping public policies and decision-making processes. Also, the concept of the negotiation structures opened additional space for the inclusion of NGO representatives in working groups for preparation, and, later on, for the conduct of negotiations. These provisions have been extensively used by NGOs and it has led to their increased visibility, interaction with authorities and, consequently, to the use of their expertise, as well as the strengthening of their impact, even though this has always been something less than the NGOs expected and actually wanted. By that time, and after a solid start, this practice has become sporadic and far too much dependent on the personal capacity and openness of the leadership in the respective ministries, as it has not turned into a mainstream approach of the authorities. This has brought the NGOs in the situation that the decisions on their inclusion into certain processes, groups and councils, have become more discretionary than merit- or even law-based.

In terms of timing, the cooperation between NGOs and government started to improve during the term of office of Prime Minister Luksic (2010-2012), when a series of diverse mechanisms for cooperation was established. With the return of multiple time Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, during the period 2012-2016, the climate significantly changed, and we witnessed years of the most notorious smear campaigns against prominent civil society representatives, supported by pro-governmental media and sometimes even institutions, especially in 2014 and 2015. It was largely expected that the government of Prime Minister Dusko Markovic, who has taken this position in November 2016, would relax the relations between NGOs and government, as he personally appeared rather open to cooperating with NGOs during his time as Deputy Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the developments went into a contrary direction and some of the bad practices established in period of Djukanovic continued and even went to the extreme.

In that context, the gravity of the current situation could be illustrated by several examples, such as:

- 1) The Council for the Development of NGOs has not convened any session since July 2016 and it is practically not functional anymore. There are also no indications that the Government considers this situation a problem, and they have not undertaken any actions to mitigate the damage made by the fact that the main institutional dialogue forum between government and NGOs practically has ceased to exist. Furthermore, there are even ideas in the Government to abolish it completely, which is strengthened by the decision of the Ministry of Public Administration to have Council for Reform of Public Administration overtaking the authorities of the Council for Development of NGOs, as announced in the draft Strategy for Development of favourable

environment for work of NGOs. The implementation of such decision would certainly represent backslide in institutional relations of NGO sector and Government; There were several attempts by the government, mainly by the Minister of European Integration and Chief Negotiator, to remove representatives of critically vocal NGO representatives from the Working Group for Chapter 23. They succeeded to keep their membership after they alarmed the public and mobilised wide support for their struggle. However, this implies a clear intention of the government to change NGOs' own decisions on appointing representatives in working groups and to remove all those whom they do not like, although it also represents a violation of existing legal procedures;

- 2) Maybe the most serious harm done to the genuine NGO sector was the opaque decision of the Montenegrin government, passed in February 2017, followed by the further operationalisation of the authorities at the Capital City of Podgorica, in March 2017, to allocate 3,697 m², including covered communal and related taxes (approx. value 950,000 EUR) to solely three NGOs considered close to the government: Civic Alliance (GA), Centre for Democratic Transition (CDT) and Fund for Active Citizenship (Fakt), for the construction of a so-called *Civic House*, thereby intervening in the autonomous field of civil society.
- 3) Funding remains the biggest challenge, and the recently passed amendments to the Law on NGOs in July 2016 aiming to create a model of decentralized funding of NGOs by ministries, only partially addressed this issue, since the proposals of the largest NGO Coalition «Through cooperation to the aim» (gathering over 100 NGOs) were only adopted to a limited extent. Namely, the amendments prescribe minimum percentages for public funding of NGOs in relation to the total state annual budget, as follows: minimum 0.3% for projects of NGOs, 0.1% for projects related to persons with disabilities and 0.1% for co-funding of projects supported by the EU. The percentages are a bit lower than the NGO Coalition requested, but if respected, it would lead to an increase of available public funds for NGOs in 2018. However, already six ministries did not respect legal provision to define funding programmes for NGOs in 2018, including Ministry of Public Administration, which is in charge for the implementation of the Law on NGOs⁷, and mostly this refers to some of the key issues related to the EU accession process, such as reform of public administration, fight against corruption, rule of law, environment, etc.
- 4) Finally, the smear campaigns against NGOs and independent media continued through pro-governmental media with clear intention to diminish the credibility of some of the most profiled and influential critically oriented NGOs and to make damage them with donors, and consequently to jeopardize their sustainability. These are especially present in the period of calls for proposals issued by the EU, and could be interpreted as an attempt to influence the decision-making process when it comes to the critically oriented NGO project proposals.

⁷ Following ministries failed to submit their funding programmes for NGOs: Ministry of Public Administration, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism, Ministry of Science and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Key risks:

- Further limitations in freedom of expression and freedom of assembly;
- Lack of adequate interest of EU for the state of affairs in the civil society sector development;
- Decrease of public trust into NGOs due to the continuous smear campaigns.

Recommendations:

1. Mechanisms for monitoring of planning and allocation of public funds by the ministries should be established to timely assess the effectiveness of the new system;
2. Conferral of management/decentralization of EU funding in Montenegro should be delayed for as long as possible, since it is clear that the authorities will try to interfere in the autonomous sphere of civil society;
3. Institutional grant schemes through EU funds should be established in order to support civil society organisations in their operational activities;
4. The Council for the Development of NGOs should be resumed and it should be upgraded in terms of its composition, i.e. the presidency should be assumed by the Deputy Prime Minister;
5. Participation of NGOs in the activities related to diverse forms of contribution to the accession process should not be dependent on their support or criticism towards the authorities, as both of these are legitimate forms of expressions;
6. The government should adopt the decision on the criteria and procedure of allocation of state-owned space and property to NGOs that will regulate transparent mechanisms for in-kind support for CSOs at all levels, and it should reconsider all the previously adopted decisions without applying any objectively verifiable criteria.
7. The EU, in particular, European Commission and European Parliament, should reflect in its relevant reports on ongoing smear campaigns through pro-governmental media against critically oriented NGOs and their leaders.

Radio Television of Montenegro: ruling party's meddling stirs fears of renewed political interference

Montenegro public broadcasted - Radio and Television of Montenegro (RTCG) is for months under the intense pressure of the ruling party which attempts to take over the leadership and regain the majority in the RTCG Council. In recent, this became more evident through the pressure on individual members of the RTCG Council who are delegated from civil society, and against whom a procedure is conducted by the parliamentary Administrative Board and the Agency for Prevention of Corruption, based on anonymous reports.

After the parliamentary elections in October 2016, there have been some major chang-

es at the RTCG. Based on the RTCG Council decision, the former RTCG General Director, Rade Vojvodic, was dismissed. In addition to personnel changes, this also resulted in changes of the television programme concept. Soon afterward, Andrijana Kadija, a longtime journalist and editor at RTCG, was elected as the General Director of RTCG. During that process, she received more votes than the former Director of the Television of Montenegro, Radojka Rutovic, whose work was repeatedly characterized as politically motivated. These changes have influenced RTCG to start profiling itself as a broadcaster in the service of all citizens of Montenegro. The whole process of electing a new General Director was monitored by the international community, above all, by the US Embassy and the EU Delegation to Montenegro, who clearly pointed out that any election of a «political director» of RTCG would be unacceptable.

Political pressure on the RTCG Council is evident in the activities of two particular institutions - the Administrative Board of the Parliament of Montenegro and the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (Agency). Based on anonymous reports, the Agency claims that a member of the RTCG Council, Goran Djurovic, a prominent CSO activist, is in a conflict of interest in the light of the Law on Prevention of Corruption. Namely, Djurovic is the founder of the company „Nature“, which deals with agricultural production. Under this Law, a person is in a conflict of interest only when the private interest of a public official affects or can affect the impartiality of public officials in the exercise of public office. The link between these two activities does not exist, and therefore, neither does the conflict of interest.

The conflict of interest in the case of election of members of the RTCG Council is in more detail defined by the Law on National Public Broadcasting RTCG, which stipulates that members of the Council cannot be persons who, as shareholders, members of management bodies, members of supervisory bodies, employees, etc., have an interest in legal entities involved in the production of radio and television programmes, so that the membership of such a person in the Council could lead to conflict of interest. This indicates also that within the mentioned company, Mr. Djurovic could not perform activities that have anything to do with the production of radio and television programmes.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the procedures targetting CSO activists represent the very first cases of anonymous reporting and such treatment directed at them by Administrative Board and the Agency. On the other hand, there are several facts demonstrating that these two institutions are directly influenced by the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS):

- In the process of election and appointment to various bodies and agencies, the Administrative Board demonstrated a gross violation of the law. Its decisions were even challenged in front of the judicial authority. By urgent action on the basis of the anonymous report, the Administrative Board showed to what extent it is working in interests of the ruling DPS.
- The Agency, since its establishment, has failed to meet the objectives of its mission in terms of track record in the fight against corruption. This is noted by relevant international stakeholders, who also seek for tangible results from this institution. In any of the segments of its jurisdiction: conflict of interests, financing of political parties, protection of whistleblowers, the Agency - in concrete cases - has demonstrated that it lacks integrity, independence, and autonomy, and that this institution is under the control of the ruling DPS. It

is interesting that as many as 1016 public officials did not comply with the deadline prescribed by the law and did not submit reports on revenues and assets in 2017. This was not the subject of urgent action by Agency, although the absence of the publication of this report represents a gross violation of the Law on Prevention of Corruption.⁸

Even though through the initiative of a group of leading NGOs in Montenegro it has been proved that there is no conflict of interest in the relevant law for the election of members of the RTCG Council, in the case of Mr. Djurovic, the Agency has decided to initiate a misdemeanor procedure for violating the Law on Prevention of Corruption against him. It is important to point out that in the sense of violation of this law, Djurovic eliminated all possible doubts about the correctness of his election to the RTCG Council. Namely, immediately after becoming aware of the prohibition prescribed by this law, which says that a public official cannot be a member of the managing authority or a manager in a company, Djurovic remedied this irregularity. The fact that he duly registered his property card, in which he also stated his function at the “Natura” company, prove that Djurovic was not aware of the provisions of this law. On the other hand, data in the Civil Registry of Business Entities shows that he has already resigned from the director position at the above-mentioned company to be in full compliance with the law.

Currently, already two RTCG council members are being dismissed in the Parliament, and in one case the respective member has decided to resign upon the decision of conflict of interest by the Agency for prevention of conflict of interest, whereas in the other case the

RTCG council member submitted an appeal to the Administrative Court but the Parliament did not even wait for the final court decision and dismiss him. It is important to note that the Parliament was deciding only by the votes of the ruling majority, as the opposition due to the boycott was not in the Parliament.

Based on all above elaborated, it is clear that so far actions and further attempts to dismiss also member of the RTCG Council from civil society would be an attempt to unlawfully change the RTCG’s governing body. The Agency should do its job, but in no way, should it be allowed to abuse or attempt to enforce the unlawful dismissal of a member of the Council. Obviously, the target is the RTCG Council, and clearly for political reasons.

Furthermore, it is symptomatic that even from the highest state addresses, during this exact period, there have been statements about the dissatisfaction with the work of RTCG which were usually followed by the more intense pressures on the RTCG. For example, Prime Minister Dusko Markovic recently gave an assessment of the work of RTCG, in which he pointed out that RTCG is not leading in the educational, cultural, and scientific programme, and it did not perform at the highest professional level addressing social issues that concern citizens. The highest DPS and governmental

⁸ More about the omissions in the work of the Agency in the period during the parliamentary elections 2016 can be found in the Final report of the CeMI Monitoring Election Mission 2016 <http://cemi.org.me/en/product/civic-monitoring-parliamentary-local-elections-montenegro-2016/> and in the policy brief „Montenegro: Elections aftermath and the European Commission’s 2016 country progress reports“ <http://cemi.org.me/en/product/posljedice-izbora-i-izvjestaj-ek-o-na-pretku-crne-gore-za-2016-godinu-dostupno-na-engleskom-jeziku/>

officials are also trying to undermine the legitimacy of the RTCG by refusing to take part in their talk shows.

In order to prevent political pressure on the work of the RTCG Council, we propose series of recommendations.

Key risks:

1. Administrative Board passes decisions under the political pressure of the ruling party, including the violations of the law;
2. Taking control of the RTCG Council by the ruling party, which would significantly slow down the process of professionalization of RTCG;
3. Continuation of negative trends in the overall state of freedom of the media in Montenegro.

Recommendations:

1. Support to media freedom in the country with focus on monitoring of this area and highlighting key issues through official reports. Montenegro is still performing poorly in this regard⁹ and facing number of problems concerning eroding media freedoms¹⁰;
2. Closely monitor, with increased attention, the actions of the Administrative Board regarding the possible removal of members of the RTCG Council;
3. Strengthen the monitoring of the work of the Anti-corruption Agency in the area of equal treatment of all public officials in accordance with the related legislation;
4. Demonstrate a clear and unambiguous attitude towards the Government of Montenegro that any kind of pressure and attempt to politicize the governing body of the RTCG is unacceptable;
5. Support the independence and process of professionalization of the RTCG through possible expert support;
6. Strengthen EU support to CSOs dealing with media analysis and monitoring of RTCG's work, as well as related work concerning the improvement of media freedoms and professionalism.

⁹ According to the World Press Freedom Index of the Reporters Without Borders, Montenegro ranks 106th out of 180 countries in the world

¹⁰ Linked also to the non-regulated allocation of public funds through the advertisements, other services and grounds to media, where pro-governmental are privileged and critically oriented media discriminated, as indicated in the CCE annual media report in this respect <http://media.cgo-cce.org/2017/10/Jendake-sanse-za-sve-medije-2017-ENG.pdf>

About authors

Zlatko Vujović is one of the founders and president of the Centre for Monitoring and Research – CeMI. He graduated from the Faculty of Law in Podgorica in 2004, and received his master's degree at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Podgorica in 2008. He is currently a Ph.D. at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Zagreb, at the Department of Comparative Public Policy.



He participated in working groups for drafting the Law on Lobbying (2010), the Law on Financing of Political Parties (2011) and the Law on the State Election Commission (2011). He co-ordinated the preparation of several legal projects, four of which (Law on Financing of Political Parties (2004) and Law on Political Parties (2004), Law on Financing of Campaign for the Selection of the President of Montenegro, Mayors and Municipal Presidents (2009) and Law on Financing Political parties – 2008) adopted in the Montenegrin parliament after two of them, as one representative of the civic initiative, represented at the plenary parliamentary session.

He co-ordinated with civic monitoring of all national elections in Montenegro from 2000 to 2009, as well as monitoring the referendum on state-level status in 2006. He participated in numerous international missions as an observer of ENEMO or OSCE (Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Moldova, Kosovo, Albania). During the parliamentary elections in Kosovo (2010-2011), he served as head of the ENEMO EOM Kosovo 2010 mission, led by a team of over 200 short-term and long-term international observers. In April 2017, Zlatko Vujovic was appointed for Secretary General of the European Network of Organization for Supervision of Elections (ENEMO).

In his research papers he deals with issues: personalization of politics and political parties, control of the electoral process, electoral systems, parties and party systems, the decision-making process in the EU, the Europeanization of national political parties and the aspects of the functioning of the European Parliament.

Daliborka Uljarević is executive director of the Centre for Civic Education (CCE/CGO), one of the leading Montenegrin NGOs dealing with Democratisation & Europeanisation, Human Rights and Active Citizenship. She is political scientist with the degree in international relations from the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Belgrade. Additionally, she specialised Comparative Media Law and Policies at the University of Oxford (UK), Regional Cooperation and European Integration at the University of Split (COIMBRA programme), Political



and Economic Systems in the organisation of Charles University and Georgetown University (Czech Republic), Local Government and Civic Society at the Theodor Heuss Academy (Germany), etc. Within the European Marshall Memorial Fellowship (GMF), she studied in USA, as their first participant from Montenegro. As expert, she is frequently engaged by CoE, UNDP, EURECNA, OSCE, UNIFEM, Sida, REC, ECOSOC, Freedom House, etc. Apart of over 15 years of NGO experience, she worked for international organisations and media, such as CoE, OSCE, IFES, BBC, etc. She is member of the advisory and governing bodies of several prominent NGOs and coalitions, as well as of the Western Balkans Advisory Committee of the global Open Society Foundations (OSF).



Publisher:
Centre for Monitoring and Research
Tel/fax: +382 (0) 20 511 424
E-mail: info@cemi.org.me
www.cemi.org.me