

The influence of intra-party regulations on intra-party democracy in the Republic of Macedonia



The Influence of Intra-Party Regulations on Intra-Party Democracy in the Republic of Macedonia

Publisher:



Centar za monitoring i istraživanje CeMI

Bul. Josipa Broza 23a

81000 Podgorica

e-mail: cemi@t-com.me

www.cemi.org.me

For publisher:

Zlatko Vujović, M.Sc.

Authors:

Viktor Dimovski, PhD,

Dane Taleski, PhD

Lura Pollozhani, M.Sc.

Design:

Studio Mouse – Podgorica, Montenegro

DISCLAIMER: The RRPP promotes social science research in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). Social science research aids in the understanding of the specific reform needs of countries in the region and in identifying the long-term implications of policy choices. Researchers receive support through research grants, methodological and thematic trainings as well as opportunities for regional and international networking and mentoring. The RRPP is coordinated and operated by the Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). The programme is fully funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent opinions of the SDC and the University of Fribourg.



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation SDC



Regional Research
Promotion Programme | **Western Balkans**



UNIVERSITÉ DE FRIBOURG
UNIVERSITÄT FREIBURG

Policy Paper

The influence of intra-party regulations on intra-party democracy in the Republic of Macedonia

Viktor Dimovski, PhD, Dane Taleski, PhD, and Lura Pollozhani, MSc

Abstract

This paper explores the influence of statutory rules and procedures on the possibilities for intra-party democracy in the six largest political parties in Macedonia, that have had the most MPs in between the national legislative elections from 2002 to 2014: VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, NSDP, SP, DUI and DPA. The paper follows the methodology of Goran Cular (2004) and the dimensions of autonomy and inclusiveness to map the intra-party regulatory framework and to assess the state of intra-party democracy. Among all parties analyzed, the possibilities for autonomous decisions and actions by the local branches is quite limited. When it comes to inclusiveness, some of the parties support pluralism and have intra-party elections. Others, on the other hand, support centralization of power and tendencies of party presidentialization, as the presidents of parties in Macedonia enjoy a significant concentration of power. The main results show that parties with a self-identified left orientation have statutory conditions which enable the highest level of intra-party democracy, followed by parties that appeal to ethnic Albanians. Parties with a self-identified right orientation have the lowest statutory conditions for intra-party democracy.

Key words: Political parties, party statutes, intra-party democracy, Macedonia

List of abbreviations

DPA	Democratic Party of Albanians
DUI	Democratic Union of Integration
NSDP	New Social Democratic Party
SDSM	The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
SP	Socialistic Party
VMRO DPMNE	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity

Introduction

The analysis of the statutes of the largest parties in Macedonia gives a clear picture of crucial intra-party characteristics. However, a major caveat needs to be pointed out, namely that the analysis is based on the party statutes, and not on the party actions in practice. By taking into consideration the highest party document that regulates the party's actions and behavior, this study assumes that these regulations are put into practice. The party selection is based on the highest numbers of MPs in parliament between the national legislative elections from 2002 to 2014. This selection criteria yielded six political parties, out of which, four appeal mainly to ethnic Macedonian voters (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, NSDP and SP), and represent both sides of the political spectra (i.e. left and right). The two remaining political parties mainly appeal to ethnic Albanian voters, of which, one is on the left-side of the political spectrum (DUI), while the other one is on the right (DPA). The analysis of intra-party democracy was done following the theoretical model of Goran Čular (2004).¹ There were two dimensions that were analyzed, the first dimension is autonomy, and the second, inclusiveness. The paper first analyzes the two dimensions and then gives a comparative evaluation of possibilities for intra-party democracy for all parties.

1. Autonomy

1.1. Members' rights and obligations

Both autonomy and inclusiveness have several sub-dimensions. The first sub-dimension of autonomy is rights and obligations of political parties' members. The analysis shows that the statutes of all parties taken in consideration have almost equal provisions in regards to members' rights, and partially the same provisions in regards to members' obligations. For example, according to the statutory provisions, the members have a right to participate in the work of the party, to take part in creation and implementation of party's positions and policies, to elect and to be elected in the party's organs, and to be informed about the party's activities.

1 Čular Goran, "Organisational Development of Parties and Internal Party Democracy in Croatia", *Politička misao*, vol. XLI (2004), no 5.

The obligations of the party members, according to the statutes, entail that the members will accept and comply to the party's programmatic documents, statute and other party acts. The members should further engage in the implementation of these documents; take care of the party's image and regularly pay the membership fee.

1.1.1. Party fractions

Most of the parties are silent about the right to form a party fraction (e.g. VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, SP and DUI); however, some make an exception (e.g. SDSM) to provide for a separate (i.e. individual, and different from a party position) opinion, proposal and position, and to protect that right.² The other two parties, NSDP and DPA, have implicit provisions for party's fraction. For example, NSDP's statute provides the possibility to harness intra-party support for a separate opinion on the basis of a prepared political platform that complies with the party's general programmatic documents. Similarly, the statute of DPA provides the right for members to have a separate opinion and to protect that right in the work of the party organs, while highlighting the individual responsibility if the separate opinion is promoted publicly and in opposition to the party's programmatic declarations.³

1.1.2 Protection from disciplinary measures

The right of protection from disciplinary measures is mentioned in the statutes of some parties, and the rest have few provisions that regulate this matter. For example, the members of DUI and DPA have the right to appeal if a measure to exclude from the party is taken. The difference is that DUI provides a committee of second instance to rule on the appeal,⁴ while DPA provides that the party presidency will rule on the appeal.⁵ According to the statute of SP, the decision to exclude a party member is enacted by the party's body that enlisted that member or a higher body, after a discussion in front of the party body where the member is also present. A party member is considered excluded if the majority of members of the party board voted in favor.⁶ The statute of VMRO-DPMNE only mentions that the procedure to determine individual responsibility of party members is regulated in a separate document⁷ and lists the basis to enact the strongest punishment

2 Article 67, Statute of SDSM

3 Article 16, Statute of DPA

4 Article 12, Statute of DUI

5 Article 15, Statute of DPA

6 Article 8, Statute of SP

7 Article 15, Statute of VMRO-DPMNE

– exclusion.⁸ It is similar with the statute of NSDP, where the conditions under which the party membership ceases to exist are listed,⁹ as well as the party bodies that are in charge, while the statute of SDSM does not have any provisions on this issue.

1.2 Autonomy of local branches

The sub-dimension on the autonomy of the local branches of political parties is analyzed in regards to the autonomy in the decision-making process and the scope of competences of central party bodies in decisions over local issues. The analysis found that in general the decision-making power for all issues, including the local ones, is concentrated in the central party bodies. Only a small fragment of decision-making is delegated to local branches. For example, when it comes to autonomy of decision-making over the structure of local branches, the statute of VMRO-DPMNE directs towards special rules of procedures that regulate the work of the local sub-branches.¹⁰ The statutes of the other parties regulate this issue in a more detailed way (e.g. DUI and DPA) or in a less detailed way (e.g. SDSM, NSDP and SP), considering decision-making on the local level, the competences of local branches, and the selection of candidates for local functions. None of the statutes has a specific provision for selection and election of candidates for local functions. In addition, none of the statutes has a specific provision for an eventual autonomy in regards to local disciplinary measures, or for creation of local coalitions.

Conversely, the scope of competences of central party bodies in decisions over local issues is considerably higher and quite disproportional in comparison to the competences of local branches. For example, according to the statute of VMRO-DPMNE, the central party bodies give political directions to the local branches in regards to how local committees should act and enact Rules

8 For acting contrary to the party statute, programmatic documents and other party acts, and for being member of a another party.

9 If the member of NSDP is at the same time member of another party registered in Republic of Macedonia, if the member is elected as NSDP candidate for MP, mayor or local council person or nominated to serve in the executive government, and acts against the party program and party statute; or if the member undermines the image of the party with his/hers behavior and work; and if the member's political actions are against the party's statute and program.

10 Article 40, Statute of VMRO-DPMNE states that this document will give the criteria for forming local sub-branches, their composition and rules of their procedure, as well as the ways how local committees and other local bodies will be elected and how they will function.

of procedures for municipal level party committees and the work of local sub-branches (e.g. competence of the party Central Committee)¹¹; enact decisions in regards to the composition of local party structures, decisions for the formation of local party structures, as well as nomination and replacement of presidents of local party structures. In addition, the central party bodies enact decisions and form bodies that oversee the work of the party members (e.g. competence of the Executive Committee)¹² and follow their work (e.g. competence of the Secretary General)¹³.

For SDSM, the president of the party has the competences to appoint the presidents of the local branches,¹⁴ and the Central board enacts decisions to form or to close down municipal organizations.¹⁵ In addition, the Central Board decides on the process, the ways and the criteria for candidates for membership of party bodies and official political appointees and for their election. The Central Board also calls the Local Conference (i.e. the highest party body on local level) after the local elections.¹⁶ The prerogatives of the highest bodies of NSDP (i.e. the competences of the Central Board) are almost identical¹⁷, and the same applies for DUI (the president¹⁸ and the General

11 Article 24, Statute of VMRO-DPMNE

12 Article 28, Statute of VMRO-DPMNE. The central executive committee decided to form the City Committee of the City of Skopje, local committees, local sub-branch committees, unions and associations; the central executive committee also appoints and dismisses the president of all other lower level committees; decides on the number of regions, elects presidents of unions and associations and party forums; creates the rules of procedure to hold members accountable to the party; forms a disciplinary commission that acts as second instance on appeal cases. Further, Article 29 stipulates that the executive committee can stop the implementation of decisions and acts enacted by local committees, local sub-branch committees, the City Committee of the City Skopje, unions, associations and forums if they are not in accordance with the party's statute and program.

13 Article 34, Statute of VMRO-DPMNE. The Secretary General follows and controls the work of the secretaries of the local committees, local sub-branch committees and the City Committee of the City Skopje

14 Article 31, Statute of SDSM. The president of SDSM appoints and dismisses the presidents of the local branches and the president of the City Organization of the City of Skopje, in procedure that is previously established by the Central Board.

15 Article 39, Statute of SDSM

16 Article 43, Statute of SDSM

17 Article 71, Statute of NSDP. The Central Board can decide to dismiss an organizational structure of NSDP if it stops to function, if the scope of activities of the party body have decreased or if the party structure does not comply to party's programmatic, statutory and declarative political goals. Article 72, Statute of NSDP. If certain organizational structures within NSDP do not fulfill the party's programmatic, statutory and political goals, then the Central Board can initiate or call a meeting of the conference on the adequate level to have a vote of confidence for the party body and eventually to elect a new body.

18 For DUI, the local branch is the only local body where the party president party can exert influence in nominating a president of the branch

party council¹⁹). According to the statutory rules of SP, the Republican Board evaluates the work of the municipal party branches and in that context has the power to change the local leadership or to disband local branches.²⁰ The executive secretaries have concrete competences in regards to local branches.²¹ The statutory rules of DPA give competence to the Central party assembly and to the Central presidency in regards to decisions to fund, suspend and to disband local party branches.²² And finally, in their statute, the NSDP incorporates the competence of the central office members to be ex-officio members of local branches,²³ and the same possibility is given in the party statute of DUI, as well.²⁴

1.3 Local branches influence on decision making on national level

The third sub-dimension, namely the possibility for local branches to directly influence decisions taken on the national level, is scarcely present in the parties' statutes. For example, the statute of VMRO-DPMNE does not mention any possibilities for local branches to influence decision-making on the national level. The statute of SDSM allows for the possibility for the Local Conference to participate in building and implementing the party's program, to elect delegates for the party Congress – SDSM central convention, and to discuss the reports of SDSM's bodies. Local branches of SP, according to their statutory rules, have the power to participate in the election of representative and executive bodies on central level, to start the procedure to change members in the party's bodies, president, vice presidents

19 Article 45, Statute of DUI.

20 Article 20, Statute of SP

21 Article 21, Statute of SP. Executive secretaries communicate everyday with local organizations and local sub-branches, give instructions for work, and participate in the work of bodies in the local organization.

22 Article 23, Statute of DPA. The decision for its establishment and its dissolution is made by the Central Assembly of the DPA. The decision for the suspension of the Branch is made by the Central Presidency. (Article 23)

23 According to the statute of NSDP, the Local Conference is the highest local body, and the Local Conference members, inter alia, are the members of NSDP's Central Board, Supervisory Board, MPs, ministers and deputy ministers.

24 Article 24, Statute of DUI. In the Assembly of the branch, the MPs, ministers, vice ministers, advisors and the mayor of DUI of that branch attend with the right to vote. The Sub-Branch Assembly is attended by MPs, ministers, vice ministers, councilors and the mayor of that sub branch with the right to vote; the members of the oversight committee without voting rights (Article 24)

and other party functionaries between two congresses,²⁵ and to call for an intermediary Congress.²⁶

NSDP has a statutory order to regularly call the Local Conference before the parliamentary election, in order to take part in proposing candidates for MPs, and to call the Conference after the elections so as to analyze the election results.²⁷ The local party conference also takes part in building and implementing the party's program and in electing delegates to the congress. The local branches of DUI have a statutory obligation to propose two candidates for MPs, and also to propose candidates for other party's functions and functions on the national level.²⁸ According to DPA's statute, local branches take part in building the party's policies and positions, elect candidates for party's bodies and propose candidates for MPs,²⁹ and the presidency of the branch is obliged to call a meeting on the local branch assembly before each election.

2. Inclusiveness

According to Čular's³⁰ theoretical model, the dimension of inclusiveness has three sub-dimensions: a) direct participation in the decision-making process, b) privileges and scope of competences of representative bodies and c) power of party president. When this framework is applied in the Macedonian case, the six analyzed parties divide in two groups: parties in which representative bodies are elected in intra-party election and their bodies enact most of the decisions, while their presidents have relatively limited competences, and parties in which the central leadership enacts all crucial decisions and their party presidents have considerable privileges and competences.

25 Article 39, Statute of SP. The procedure to exclude party members, president, vice presidents and other SP party functionaries between two congresses can be initiated ... on request of more than half of the local branches and the City Organization of SP.

26 Article 16, Statute of SP. The initiative to call an extraordinary congress can come from more than half of the local branches and the City Board of the Socialist Party of Macedonia.

27 Article, 24. Statute of NSDP.

28 Article 31 and 45, Statute of DUI.

29 Article 29, Statute of DPA.

30 Čular Goran, "Organisational Development of Parties" (2004)

2.1 Direct participation in the decision-making process

The analysis of this sub-dimension among the parties in Macedonia was focused on representative bodies of their local branches, because the election of higher party bodies is indirect, meaning they use a delegate model. In regards to this point, the statute of VMRO-DPMNE has no concrete rule, but mentions that there are special Rules of procedure for local sub-branches.³¹ According to the statute of SDSM, the forms of direct participation are present at the Local Conference and at the level of local sub-branches of the party.³² The Local Conference is called for regular and electoral sessions,³³ especially before the local elections, with the aim to determine the candidates for local elections, and after the elections have finished to analyze the electoral results.³⁴ In the framework of the local sub-branches, the statute of SDSM envisages the existence of a permanent debate – a democratic forum as a form through which members can influence the work and activities of SDSM; however, without any decision-making competences.³⁵

The statute of NSDP gives the highest position to the Local Conference at the municipal level, which elects the members of the party's bodies with a secret vote.³⁶ The statute of this party gives the possibility to party sympathizers

31 Article 40, Statute of VMRO-DPMNE. The criteria to form local sub-branches, their composition, and the way to work and the way to elect committee members and other bodies of the sub-branch, are regulated by Rules of procedure for the local sub-branches of VMRO-DPMNE.

32 Article, 52. Statute of SDSM. The local sub-branch of SDSM is the basic form of political engagement in the party and in fulfilling members' rights and obligations that derive from the party statute. The decision to form a local sub-branch is done by the Executive board of the local branch according to SDSM's statute or on the request of at least 5 party members, what is at the same time the minimum number of party members that are required to form a local sub-branch.

33 SDSM maintains that the Executive board of the local branch calls the Local Conference at least once per year, and regularly every four years as an electoral Local Conference.

34 And also to vote on confidence of the elected bodies of the local branch taking in consideration the electoral results.

35 Article 56, Statute of SDSM. On the region of one or more local sub-branches, the executive board of the local branch can make a decision to form a permanent debate structure – a democratic forum. The debate structure – democratic forum is a form through which the membership is informed about the party's activities, about the decisions of the organization and bodies, and form through which the members can influence the work and activities of SDSM. The debate does have power to decide.

36 Article 50, Statute of NSDP. The election of members in the bodies of NSDP is done through secret voting. The candidates who get plurality of votes are elected; however, they have to have over 1/3 of votes from the total number of members in the body that elects the candidates. If during the elections all of the seats are not allocated, based on the number of votes, candidates are selected to fill all of the seats in the way that is regulate

to take part in the activities of the party, not only party members.³⁷ In SP's local branches, the Assembly of members in the area of the local sub-branch and the Electoral assembly are the basic party structures through which the members in the party's bodies are elected.³⁸ At the same time, the local branches of this party, on the level of each electoral unit for national legislative elections, form a special body to coordinate the activities in regard to the national legislative elections.³⁹ For DUI, the Local Council is the basic organizational structure of the party, in which the members debate together with the higher organizational structures (sub-branches and branches) about local issues and can propose candidates for representatives in higher executive bodies.⁴⁰ And finally, the membership of DPA has the possibility to participate indirectly in the work of the sub-branches and local party branches, where they can articulate their political will and elect the local leadership through electoral assemblies.⁴¹

in special rules of procedure or in a way that the electorate will decide. In all bodies of NSDP there has to be at least 20% of members younger than 30 years, and at least 30% of members from both genders.

- 37 Article 9, Statute of NSDP. Sympathizers of the party and non-party members can take part in the activities of the party, they can be present at the sessions of party's bodies and party's working groups, without a right to decide and without having active and passive voting right.
- 38 For SP, these are the board of local sub-branches, president and supervisory board.
- 39 Article 29, Statute of SP. The assembly of members in the area of the local sub-branch elects a board of the local sub-branch, president and supervisory board. Article 30, the Electoral assembly, of the local branch, elects local board, president and vice president if the Electoral assembly considers that there is a need for the local board to elect an executive board and secretary of the local board. Local organizations of SP in the framework of the national legislative electoral unit can form a body to coordinate the party's activities in regards to the parliamentary elections. Article 32, the Electoral assembly of the City organization elects a City board, president of the City organization and supervisory board. The City board, from its members elects an executive board and secretary of the City board. The City board can elect vice presidents of the City organization, if it decides that they are needed.
- 40 Article 17, Statute of DUI. The members of the party at the local level can participate through the Local Council, the Sub-Branch and the Branch. Article 45, Statute of DUI. The most important of the local bodies is the Branch which can propose the candidates for MPs, ministers and other functionaries. Article 53, in addition, the Congress, which is the highest body of the party, has representative of Branches. Article 54, their number is determined by the results of the last elections. Article 59, Some of the representative in Congress can also become part of the General Council, the highest organ between two Congresses. Decisions are taken by a majority of votes, either of the general number of members, or of the ones present, depending on what is being voted on. Most often, there should be over 50% support for a motion or candidature to pass. All voting procedures are discussed under the relevant body and article; there is no general article on voting.
- 41 Article 17, statute of DPA. The members of the party at the local level can participate through the Sub Branch and the Branch, of which the latter has the most influence in

2.2 Privileges and scope of competences of representative bodies

The privileges and scope of competences of representative bodies of political parties in Macedonia (i.e. party congress), in comparison with the privileges and the scope of competences of executive bodies at the central level are analyzed in regards to the competences of representative bodies in adoption of the party program and statute, the election of central political and executive bodies and their competences in the procedure of candidate selection. All parties are similar in the sense that the highest representative body at the national level is the one that is in charge to adopt programmatic documents and the party statute. In addition, the highest representative body elects the party president and members of highest representative and executive bodies of the party. For example, the party president in the cases of VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, NSDP, SP, DUI and DPA is elected at the party congress. The difference is that the congress of SDSM also elects the deputy president of the party, on proposal of the party president; while the congresses of NSDP and SP elect the Central/Republican board and supervisory board, and the congress of DUI elects the General Council. On the other hand, the election of a party's vice presidents among all parties is left to their central/main boards/councils. For example, for VMRO-DPMNE the Central committee elects the Secretary General and members of the Executive committee of the party, for SDSM the Secretary General, organizational secretary and the secretary for international cooperation are elected by the Central Board, for NSDP and SP the Central/Republic board elects the secretary/general secretary, executive secretaries and members of supervisory boards, for DUI the Central Board elects the Secretary General the organizational secretary and members of the presidency, and for DPA the Central Board elects the members of the central presidency.

The competences for the procedure for candidate selection, and especially for the candidates for party lists in the parliamentary and local elections, are given to the executive bodies, and the selection is verified by the representative party bodies. In the same manner, the executive bodies are responsible for

nominations (Article 21). Article 24, in addition the Branch can be represented as a legal person and be registered to perform economic activities for its operation with a special decision by the Central Chairmanship of the party (Articles 40 and 43). Members can directly participate in Congress, which is DPA's highest body (Article 38), and the Central Assembly and Chairmanship. Article 52, the organs of DPA decide on a meritocratic basis if a meeting is attended by more than half of the members of the organ, with the condition that the number of votes is not less than 1/3 of the members of the organ. The program, the statute and the report on the work of the organs is approved with a majority of votes from the general number of the members of the organ.

the procedural aspects (i.e. opening intra-party elections, setting the candidates' criteria, deadlines etc), and the representative bodies formally adopt the rules. More concretely, VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM and NSDP proscribe that the congress is the body to confirm/adopt the candidates for MPs, and DUI and DPA gives competence for this to the General Council, in the case of the former, and Central Assembly, in the case of the later.

2.3 Power of party president

The analysis of the inclusiveness dimension concludes by taking into consideration the power of the party president, through looking at the right to propose/appoint vice president(s) and members of central bodies, the right to suspend, replace and exclude party members, the power to influence the candidate selection procedures at the central and local level, as well as other presidents' prerogatives. Similar to other parties in the region, the presidents of parties in Macedonia enjoy a significant concentration of power. According to the statutes of the six analyzed parties, the presidents are elected by the highest representative body of the party (i.e. Congress), and according to statutory rules, the presidents have wide competences in regards to proposing other party's functionaries in representative and executive bodies. For example, the presidents of the big four parties (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI⁴² and DPA) propose the party's vice presidents, and also the deputy president in the case of SDSM. In addition, the president of VMRO-DPMNE proposes the election and dismissal of the Secretary General and the members of the Executive committee, the president of DUI proposes the Secretary General, members of the General Council and other party functionaries, and the president of DPA proposes the Secretary and members of the Central presidency that are voted on by the General assembly.⁴³ The statutes of VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM have no provisions on president's competence to suspend or to exclude party members, while NSDP, DUI and DPA have some provisions that relate to president's competences to submit proposals to dismiss, or to suspend and disband branches in case of statutory breaches⁴⁴ and other party decisions⁴⁵. All president, according to the analyzed statutes have a

42 Article 67, Statute of DUI.

43 Article 41 and 43, Statute of DPA.

44 Article 40, Statute of DUI. The president of the party suspends decisions taken by the Branch and can dissolve the Branch, Sub Branch or the Local Councils if they violate the program or Party statute; the President proposes the President of a Party Branch.

45 Article 45, Statute of DPA. The president of the party on occasion of severe violation of work, disrespect of the Statute and other decision of the organs of the party by the branches, has the right to propose the suspension and dissolution of the Branch with the condition

strong influence in regard to internal procedures for candidate selection on central and local level in practice; however, this is explicitly stated only in the party statute of SDSM.⁴⁶

3. Comparative summary and conclusion

Following the work of Cular⁴⁷, and the RRPP-supported research projects in other Western Balkan countries, the team conducted grading and evaluation of the six parties. Each of the sub-dimensions for the two dimensions (Autonomy and Inclusiveness) was graded on a scale from 0 to 3. The grade of 0 was given if there were no statutory provisions and/or the issues of the sub-dimension in question were not specifically mentioned. As in previous applications of the grading scale, a higher score denoted greater possibilities to have intra-party democracy. For example, 3 meant that all possibilities for the sub-dimension are present in order to contribute toward more intra-party democracy; 2 meant that some possibilities are present, and 1 meant that only a few, basic, possibilities are present. However, the direction of the grading scale was reversed for the “concentration of power in the party president”. This is the last sub-dimension within the Inclusiveness dimension. A higher score denoted that there is greater concentration of power in the hands of the party president. Since this is a condition that lowers intra-party democracy, the scale was reversed. This means that a score of 1 denotes that the party president has the highest concentration of power; however, this is the lowest score for this sub-dimension to contribute toward intra-party democracy. Similarly, a score of 3 denotes that the concentration of power of the party president is low, which is a contributing factor for intra-party democracy. The reversal of the grading scale was needed to have all of the grades contributing towards the same direction in relation to intra-party democracy. The tables 1 and 2 below show the comparative evaluation for all parties in both sub-dimensions.

that within 15 days a group is selected, which will lead it until the next assembly of the branch.

46 The president of SDSM appoints and dismisses presidents of local branches and the president of the City organization of the City of Skopje, in a procedure that the Central board has previously adopted.

47 (2004),

Table 1. Evaluation of dimension of Autonomy among political parties in Macedonia

Autonomy	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	NSDP	SP	DUI	DPA
Members' right and protection	1	3	3	2	1	1
Autonomy of local branches	1	3	3	2	2	2
Local branches influence on decision -making on national level	0	1	3	1	3	3
Total	2	7	9	5	6	6

It is important to highlight at the outset the major caveat stated in the introduction. The analysis and evaluation takes into consideration only the formal rules that are written on paper; however, it does not analyze the extent to which parties follow the rules that should govern their behavior in practice. The total results show that NSDP has the highest possibilities for autonomy in their statute. The possibilities are present to the fullest in each of the sub-dimensions. Second is SDSM, which gives full possibilities to members' rights and protection and autonomy of local branches. However, it gives local branches very limited possibilities to influence decision-making at the national level. DUI and DPA have a similar intra-party pattern of regulation. They have low possibilities for member's rights and obligations, a bit higher autonomy of local branches and give high possibilities to local branches to influence decision-making at the national level.

According to the SP statute, member's rights and obligations and the autonomy of local branches are moderate, while the possibilities of local branches to influence decision-making at the national level are lower. According to VMRO-DPMNE's statute, it is the party with the least possibilities for autonomy. The party statute of VMRO-DPMNE gives very limited possibilities for member's rights and obligations and limited autonomy to local branches. At the same time, the statute is silent about possibilities of local branches to influence decision-making at the national level. It specifies that this should be regulated in a separate document that would outline the rules of procedure. While it is unclear why the party did not specify the procedure in the highest legal act and opt for an act with lower power to govern this behavior; VMRO-DPMNE received a 0 for this sub-dimension due to the lack of any


written provisions. This additionally lowered the score of VMRO-DPMNE for autonomy.

Table 2. Evaluation of dimension of Inclusiveness among political parties in Macedonia

Inclusiveness	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	NSDP	SP	DUI	DPA
Direct participation of members	0	3	3	0	2	2
Privileges and competences that representative bodies have in regard to executive	1	3	3	3	2	2
Concentration of power in party president	1	1	1	3	1	1
Total	2	7	7	6	5	5

Considering inclusiveness, the evaluation resulted in the same score for four of the parties; however, the intra-party patterns are different. For example, SDSM and NSDP give the highest possibilities, in their statutes, for direct participation of members, and for privileges and competences of representative bodies in regard to executive ones. On the other hand, the concentration of power in the hands of their party presidents is very significant. On the other hand, DUI and DPA give moderate possibilities for the direct participation of members, and for privileges and competences of representative bodies in regard to executive ones; however, the power concentrated in the hands of the party presidents is high. SP has no statutory provisions for direct participation of members; however it gives highest possibilities for privileges and competences of representative bodies in regard to executive ones and the power concentrated in the hands of the party presidents is very low. On the other hand, VMRO-DPMNE does not have any provisions about direct participation of members. The party also gives very limited possibilities for privileges and competences of representative bodies in regard to executive ones, while the power concentrated in the hands of the party presidents is very high.

Table 3. Position of political parties in Macedonia on the dimensions of Autonomy and Inclusiveness



In conclusion, the political parties in Macedonia provide relatively high possibilities for inclusiveness, while most of them provide moderate possibilities for autonomy. This means that they are willing to expand and integrate and that they are less willing to support diversity of opinions and actions. According to their statutes, parties seem open for diversity, but would like to have more unified political positions and actions. Finally, the analysis shows that parties of self-identified left orientation have statutory conditions for highest level of intra-party democracy, followed by ethnic Albanian parties and that parties of self-identified right orientation have the lowest statutory conditions for intra-party democracy.

4. Policy recommendations

The paper makes three sets of recommendations. The first are addressed to some political parties whose statutes do not regulate all of the issues that are important for autonomy and inclusiveness as main dimensions for intra-party democracy. For example, this is the case with VMRO-DPMNE and SP, regarding the direct participation of members (dimension Inclusiveness) and VMRO-DPMNE regarding the local branches' influence on decision-making at the national level (dimension Autonomy). Their statutes are silent on these issues or refer to other by-rules. It would be advisable for the parties to regulate all issues in their statutes, as it is the highest formal legal document for the party. The statute should provide the rules and procedures that regulate all aspects of intra-party activities. The party statute is also a public document. Having an elaborate party statute allows to have a transparent basis for intra-party activities and also provides clarity, predictability and stability of internal rules and procedures for party members. A transparent and elaborate party statute is a basic element to empower the party members and to have minimal conditions for intra-party democracy.

The second set of recommendations are addressed to all of the parties. These recommendations entail changes in the rules to increase conditions for intra-party democracy. One avenue for pursuing this goal is for each individual party to change their statutory rules. Another avenue is to make changes in the existing party law and to proscribe rules that govern elements of intra-party structures and activities. For example, conditions for intra-party democracy would improve, if the party decides to decrease the power concentrated in the hands of their party president. Almost in all of the political parties taken in consideration, the concentration of power in the hands of the president is considerable and this is a significant impediment for intra-party democracy. Similarly, parties should improve the autonomy of their local branches and increase the influence of local branches in decision-making at the national level. It could be beneficial for the party if their local branch has the power to decide on local coalition making. In that way, local interests would move more strongly to the fore and it would allow for a variety of configurations in coalition making, at the local and national level. In turn, the variety of cooperative configurations may be helpful to decrease political polarization and/or structure patterns of cross-party cooperation.

The last set of recommendations are addressed to all political parties; however, they do not require change of rules and procedures, but their implementation in practice. The analysis was based only on the parties' statutes and it did not

take in consideration the parties' practices. In a way, this recommendation is out of the scope of the analysis. Most of the political party statutes show that conditions to have intra-party democracy is on satisfactory level. However, the question is to what extent is this upheld in practice? The question merits an independent research and a new analysis, but a first-hand impression of parties' activities also calls the parties "to practice what they preach". A series of capacity building activities should be undertaken to increase members' awareness about the party's statute and the possibilities it gives in practice. However, the underlining condition is for the party to have sufficient political will and a stable environment to allow intra-party democratic practices to flourish.

