Author: Predrag Nikolić (Monitor)
In May 2025, the Judicial Council and the Prosecutorial Council adopted new rules governing the performance appraisal system for judges and state prosecutors. Previous rules failed to function, and the first results of the new ones will be seen during this year. Experts praise the improvements while warning of numerous challenges, whereas judges protest against rules they claim are still unclear and discriminatory.
For years, the appraisal of judges and prosecutors was a formality in which judicial office holders were predominantly assigned the highest scores. The European Commission has warned for years that this task must be conducted based on measurable results. In the latest European Commission Report on Montenegro (November 2025), clear recommendations were maintained for further reform of the appraisal system for judges and prosecutors to ensure it is more efficient and based exclusively on merit.
In May 2025, the Judicial Council and the Prosecutorial Council adopted new rules governing the appraisal system for judges and state prosecutors. The new appraisal systems were presented as a significant step forward in establishing a transparent, fair, and merit-based process for evaluating the work of judicial office holders.
NEW SYSTEM, OLD WAYS
The new appraisal system has not yet taken full effect; consequently, only 20 judges were appraised during 2025. According to data provided to Monitor by the Judicial Council, of that number, 11 judges were appraised during the promotion process, seven were appraised through the regular appraisal procedure, and two were candidates for court president positions. The practice of previous years continued, resulting in no negative grades—12 judges were rated as "excellent," seven as "good," and one judge received a "satisfactory" rating. During 2025, there were no appraisal procedures for the work of Supreme Court judges.
The Judicial Council, headed by Radoje Korać, explains that the appraisal of judges is conducted to evaluate their expertise, quality of work, ethics, and the need for professional development, as well as for the purpose of promotion.
Unlike the judiciary, there were no appraisals within the prosecution service last year. The Prosecutorial Council, chaired by Supreme State Prosecutor Milorad Marković, told Monitor that this occurred due to objective reasons: "Amendments to the Law on the State Prosecutor's Office changed the criteria and sub-criteria for evaluating the work of state prosecutors, which required the adoption of new Rules for the Appraisal of State Prosecutors and Heads of State Prosecution Offices, which entered into force on May 27, 2025. The mandate of the Prosecutorial Council members expired on August 5, 2025, and new Council members from the ranks of distinguished lawyers were elected on November 19, 2025; therefore, it was not possible to form the Commission for the Appraisal of State Prosecutors earlier, nor to adopt an Appraisal Plan. For this reason, the appraisal of state prosecutors was put on hold in 2025."
FAILED STRATEGIES
Proclaimed guidelines from previous judicial reform strategies—asserting that the selection, promotion, and determination of the accountability of judges and prosecutors are fundamental guarantees of judicial independence—have faced a total debacle, according to assessments by domestic non-governmental organizations and experts over the past years.
"The previous system was characterized by excessive formality, a focus on statistical indicators, and an almost complete absence of a substantive assessment of the quality of work. Criteria were vague and often allowed for arbitrary interpretations, while the justifications for grades were sparse or stereotypical. Such an approach did not encourage professional development, nor did it serve as an effective tool for strengthening accountability," lawyer Boris Marić told Monitor.
The inadequacy of the previous appraisal process is highlighted by data from 2016 to 2021: out of 116 prosecutors working in the Special, Basic, and Higher prosecution offices, 115 were rated with the highest grade—"excellent"—while only one received a "good" rating. A similar practice continued through 2022, and it was only in recent years that some changes were observed, showing that not every single prosecutor receives the highest marks.
Pilot appraisal projects in the judiciary also failed. For instance, in 2017, half of the judges at the Nikšić Basic Court received unsatisfactory grades. These poor ratings were the result of judges failing to pursue professional development and not participating in "various professional activities." It occurred that judges who received "excellent" ratings in all other criteria were given a final grade of "good" simply due to a lack of additional training.
The President of the Supreme Court, Vesna Medenica, who simultaneously headed the Commission for the Appraisal of Judges, announced reforms to the appraisal system on several occasions.
REPORT BY THE AGENCY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
Even after the departure and prosecution of Medenica, things did not significantly improve. In March 2022, the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (ASK), while headed by Jelena Perović, submitted an opinion to the Special State Prosecutor’s Office (SDT) concluding that the retroactive application of amendments to the rules for appraising judges and court presidents—adopted by the Judicial Council on August 6, 2021—represented a threat to the public interest and could undermine the integrity of that body. ASK submitted this document to the prosecution for an assessment of whether a criminal offense subject to ex officio prosecution had been committed, noting that documents provided to ASK suggested that some judges' grades were changed through the application of new rules, enabling their promotion.
The Judicial Council, then headed by Vesna Simović-Zvicer, responded that it would certainly inform the Agency of its stance regarding the submitted opinion in accordance with the Law on the Prevention of Corruption, although it maintained that the procedure for assessing the legality of an act—including the rules for appraising judges and court presidents—does not fall within ASK's jurisdiction.
At that time, the Appraisal Commission consisted of President Vesna Vučković, and members Vladimir Novović (then a judge of the High Court in Podgorica), Ana Perović-Vojinović (a judge of the Administrative Court), Dragan Babović (a judge of the Basic Court in Podgorica), and lawyer Loro Markić (a member of the Judicial Council from the ranks of distinguished lawyers).
Part of the media claimed at the time that based on "doctored" grades from the Appraisal Commission, the Judicial Council selected reporting judge Seka Piletić—known for the case involving the overturning of the verdict in the 2016 "coup attempt" case—as one of the candidates for the Supreme Court of Montenegro.
In March 2022, Piletić was elected as a judge of the Supreme Court of Montenegro. A year later, ASK issued an opinion stating that "the procedure for electing Seka Piletić as a judge of the Supreme Court of Montenegro, contrary to valid regulations, constitutes a threat to the public interest under Article 44, Paragraph 2 and Article 72 of the Law on the Prevention of Corruption and may undermine the integrity of the Judicial Council." Seka Piletić retired in July 2025.
In the meantime, the SDT initiated criminal proceedings against the former director of ASK, Perović, charging her with several criminal offenses, including abuse of office and falsifying official documents.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In addition to the purely formal appraisal of judges and prosecutors, disciplinary proceedings in the previous period were also ineffective. The rare disciplinary actions conducted within the judiciary mostly ended with symbolic penalties—salary reductions ranging from 20% to a maximum of 40% for a few months.
A notable case is that of Special Prosecutor Saša Čađenović, who was disciplinarily sanctioned in 2012 with a 15% salary reduction for three months while serving as a prosecutor at the Basic State Prosecutor's Office (ODT) in Podgorica. At the time, he arbitrarily took over a case assigned to another prosecutor—"and then, without the knowledge of the prosecutor or the case handler, prevented the dispatch of a decision made by the handler (which the state prosecutor had previously agreed upon), unauthorizedly drafted a different decision, signed it as the case handler, and submitted it to the prosecutor for review."
In 2022, the Special State Prosecutor's Office filed an indictment against Čađenović for the criminal offense of creating a criminal organization and six counts of abuse of office. He is accused of becoming a member of the "Kavač Clan" criminal organization in mid-2020, with the task—as a special prosecutor—of not initiating criminal prosecutions or proceedings against the organizers and members of that criminal organization. According to the indictment, Čađenović prevented the discovery of perpetrators of the most serious crimes, avoided ordering their detention, and removed reports provided by EUROPOL, as well as criminal charges filed by the police against them, from the case files.
Since the beginning of the Prosecutorial Council's work, not a single prosecutor has been dismissed. A 2013 decision by the Prosecutorial Council to dismiss prosecutor Romina Vlahović due to negligent and unprofessional conduct was overturned. To preempt disciplinary proceedings, some prosecutors and judges resigned before dismissal proceedings could even be initiated.
One of the rare cases in recent years where a judge's disciplinary liability was established on any grounds is the case of High Court Judge Suzana Mugoše. She was sanctioned with a 30% salary reduction for three months and a two-year ban on promotion due to her statements expressing belief that the Appellate Court's verdict in the "Coup Attempt" case—which overturned her conviction—had been "bought."
Also indicative is the disciplinary proceeding that began in 2014, following the arrival of Blažo Jovanić at the head of the Commercial Court. He initiated disciplinary action against Judge Nataša Bošković, claiming she performed her judicial function improperly by failing to schedule hearings and otherwise delaying proceedings.
Bošković responded by claiming that the proceedings against her were initiated at the order of Vesna Medenica, with Jovanić acting as the executor. In an era when Medenica's power over the judiciary was absolute, Bošković stated that the Disciplinary Commission was operating illegally and sought the disqualification of the President of the Judicial Council, Mladen Vukčević. At that time, the Council included then-President of the Supreme Court Vesna Medenica, Minister of Justice Duško Marković, and judges Radoje Orović, Milić Međedović, Željka Jovović, Dobrica Šljivančanin, Loro Markić, and Vesna Simović-Zvicer.
The Constitutional Court upheld Judge Bošković's appeal, and the disciplinary proceedings against her were halted a decade later, in May 2025. In the meantime, multiple criminal proceedings have been initiated against Vesna Medenica and the former President of the Commercial Court, Blažo Jovanić.
CLEARER AND STRICTER INDICATORS
The Judicial Council explained to Monitor that the main innovations in the current appraisal system, compared to previous ones, involve distinct criteria and sub-criteria applied to evaluate the efficiency of a judge's work, the quantity and quality of their output, the quality of the legal reasoning in their decisions, and so on. Judges' performances are now evaluated every five years, as opposed to every three years previously.
According to the Prosecutorial Council, the new Rules for Appraisal establish clearer and stricter indicators for assessing work criteria and sub-criteria. They explain that the "quality and quantity of work" sub-criterion now consists of 10 indicators, which are scored individually; subsequently, in accordance with Article 12 of the Rules, a final grade for this sub-criterion is determined.
"The appraisal system has also been improved through the implementation of a new algorithm within the information system of the Secretariat of the Prosecutorial Council. This allows for the selection of cases that serve as the source for appraisal through a random sampling method from each year in which a state prosecutor's work is being evaluated," the Prosecutorial Council explained.
Marić states that the new rules represent a step forward compared to the previous system, primarily because they are formally more precise and attempt to introduce clearer benchmarks for evaluating judicial office holders. He also views the increased emphasis—at least at the normative level—on the consistency of practice and transparency of the appraisal process as a positive development. However, their actual impact will depend on how they are applied in practice and the councils' willingness to implement them consistently and without selectivity, Marić emphasizes.
He points out that serious challenges remain: "It is particularly concerning that some criteria are still broadly defined, leaving room for subjectivity. Furthermore, it is not sufficiently clear how ethics, integrity, and professional standards are valued in practice, nor is there a clear mechanism to harmonize appraisals across different commissions or councils."
Action for Human Rights (HRA), which has monitored this issue for years, assesses that while the new rules are an improvement, certain deficiencies persist.
"Although the appraisal of Supreme Court judges is now mandated, the same is still not provided for state prosecutors in the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office. There is no justifiable reason to exempt these prosecutors from appraisal, as monitoring their work is equally important—which is also a recommendation of the Venice Commission," Amra Bajrović, legal advisor at HRA, told Monitor.
She adds that while state prosecutors are now evaluated based on decisions from the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights, such a criterion is not stipulated for judges.
"Additionally, we believe that the assessment of a state prosecutor's quality of work should take into account the number of accepted or rejected motions for detention (ordering or extending), the number of upheld complaints regarding decisions to dismiss criminal charges, as well as final verdicts from regular courts. We continue to stress the need to investigate the reasons behind the statute of limitations expiring in any case; a commission should determine the potential liability of the competent judge or prosecutor, and if liability is established, it should directly impact their performance appraisal," Bajrović points out.
Marić believes the key will be whether the new system leads to a realistic distinction between high-quality and low-quality work and strengthens public trust in the judiciary: "This will be particularly visible through monitoring the sustainability of verdicts and indictments, as well as the consequences if these legal acts prove unsustainable at a rate of 30 percent or more."
"It will be significant to monitor the work of the councils' expert commissions conducting the appraisals. I would note that, while a step forward has been made, there was not enough professional courage for the councils to add a check of judicial and prosecutorial integrity to this process—to elaborate those criteria and provide a clear contribution to what is publicly known as 'vetting,'" Marić concludes.
According to this year's Judge Appraisal Plan, the Judicial Council intends to evaluate all judges who have not been appraised in the previous period. In addition to them, judges elected for the first time will be appraised three years after taking office, as well as judges without an appraisal who apply for promotion, and those applying for the Administrative and Commercial Courts. Judges who previously received an "unsatisfactory" rating will also be re-evaluated.
Since no appraisals were conducted last year, the Prosecutorial Council announced that the process of evaluating state prosecutors and heads of prosecution offices under the new Rules would begin in February of this year.
UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING THE NEW RULES
Tanja Vidić, the Acting President of the Basic Court in Cetinje, told Monitor that appraisal under the new rules has not yet begun.
She notes that the new rules have changed the criteria relating to the "quality of work" sub-criterion, and she believes that the innovations in the rules will greatly contribute to better ratings because the aforementioned sub-criterion directly depends on the number of cases in the court.
"However, this sub-criterion is not a true measure of work quality in courts with a high volume of cases, both in terms of total caseload and cases where an appeal has been filed. For example, if an appeal is filed in 200 cases and 15 verdicts are overturned, that is 7.5%; meanwhile, in smaller courts, the number of appealed cases is lower because they don't have a large influx—so, out of 100 cases, if 15 are overturned, that is 15%. Therefore, it is clear that this is merely a matter of statistics, and not a true measure of a judge's quality of work," Vidić explains.
She further adds that appraisal is not governed solely by the Rules for the Appraisal of Judges and Court Presidents, but also by the Law on Judges and the Judicial Council. She notes that certain ambiguities remain which could lead to a situation where "a judge whose work is rated as 'satisfactory' is placed in an unequal position because they are blocked from promotion for the next five years—the timeframe for the next regular appraisal—while a judge whose work is rated as 'unsatisfactory' can seek promotion after only one year [upon re-evaluation]."
REBELLION IN THE SPECIAL DEPARTMENT
In early March, several media outlets reported that judges of the Special Department of the High Court in Podgorica addressed the Judicial Council, requesting to be exempted from the current appraisal system.
Criticism from the President of the Supreme Court, Valentina Pavličić, expressed during a Judicial Council session, was also relayed: "Last February, we elected eight judges to the Special Department, and out of those eight, we have perhaps two cases adjudicated in a year," the President of the Supreme Court stated.
Pavličić announced that when Supreme Court judges begin monitoring the work of the Special Department, they will "fully adhere to those guidelines." She emphasized: "So let the gentlemen protest when we start appraising them."
The High Court reacted, with judges of the Special Department clarifying that they had appealed on several occasions for the specificities of their department—and other legal fields—to be taken into account to ensure an objective appraisal of all judges. They referred to proposals submitted by High Court judges, as well as individual suggestions and objections raised during the drafting of previous Appraisal Rules in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission and Council of Europe experts, which were not adopted.
In earlier objections submitted to the Judicial Council by 11 judges of the Criminal Department of the High Court in Podgorica, it was stated that the appraisal rules are not in line with EU standards and that implementing this method would lead to serious practical problems. They explained their fear that the most capable judges would receive lower ratings due to the appraisal methodology.
In objections recently sent to the Ministry of Justice, High Court Judge Goran Šćepanović explained that cases involving organized crime, corruption, money laundering, and other serious crimes are objectively the most complex. "In terms of complexity, volume, and duration, one such case corresponds to dozens of 'regular' cases. However, under current criteria, a judge of the Special Department who completes five such cases is rated the same as a judge who completes five simple cases (e.g., petty theft, light bodily injury...)," Šćepanović stated.
He warned that this could lead to:
Demotivation of these judges.
The risk of "unsatisfactory" ratings even when a judge performs exceptionally well.
Inequality in the treatment of judges.
An incentive to avoid complex cases—as a judge seeking a good rating has an interest in handling simple cases with a low risk of being overturned.
Šćepanović proposed that special criteria be applied to Special Department judges that acknowledge the objective complexity of cases within that department's jurisdiction. "Judges must be equal before the law and the appraisal system. Using the same criterion for a judge handling petty offenses and a judge presiding over multi-year proceedings against organized criminal groups does not constitute equal criteria," Šćepanović concluded.
The objections from the Criminal Department judges noted that in Croatia, for judges handling organized crime and war crimes cases, the workload (quantity) is not expressed numerically, nor is quality calculated the same way as for other judges. Instead, they are appraised using special sub-criteria: "Here, special attention is paid to each specific case a judge handles in terms of complexity, scope, number of defendants, etc., which we consider completely justified."
In their response, the judges of the Special Department of the High Court in Podgorica wrote that they intend to propose amendments to the existing Rules to align them with European standards. They argued that the current rules are evidently flawed, contrary to Venice Commission recommendations, and should be modeled after the Croatian system. "We believe the existing Rules discriminate against a certain category of judges and represent a direct attack on their independence, which is why, to our knowledge, they are also subject to review before the Constitutional Court," the judges stated.
CONDITION FOR CLOSING CHAPTER 23
Shortly before the protests from the judges of the Special Department, the Judicial Council announced that it had adopted a Decision on amending the rules for appraising judges in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.
The main criteria emphasized by the Venice Commission for the appraisal of judges and prosecutors include professional competence, integrity and ethics, efficiency and quantity of work, assessment of work quality, and continuous professional development. There is also an insistence on removing political influence, primarily by ensuring that the Minister of Justice does not participate in the work of the Judicial Council to avoid political pressure.
To fulfill this criterion, the Government established a Proposal for amending the Constitution of Montenegro in mid-February, changing the composition and selection process for members of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils. The amendments stipulate that the Minister of Justice will no longer be a member of this body, that the majority of the Judicial Council will consist of judges elected by their peers, and that non-judge members will be elected based on professional references and integrity, according to objective and measurable criteria. The proposed changes for the Prosecutorial Council envision that members from the ranks of distinguished lawyers be elected by a qualified majority.
All of this follows the recommendations of the European Commission (EC), which insists on greater transparency from the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, particularly in publishing detailed, reasoned decisions on promotions, appointments, and disciplinary proceedings. The need to avoid formalism in appraisal was also highlighted, ensuring the process truly reflects professional integrity and efficiency rather than just statistical data on the number of resolved cases. The EC further pointed out that the track record regarding the accountability of judges and prosecutors remains limited and that the system must be stricter toward violations of ethical codes and professional obligations.
The announced changes are conditioned by the need to close Chapter 23 in negotiations with the EU, with the aim of bringing the Montenegrin judiciary closer to the levels of accountability and professionalism found in member states.
(The article was produced as part of the project "Open Trials – Monitoring Cases of High-Level Corruption and Organized Crime," jointly implemented by the Center for Monitoring and Research (CeMI) and the Trade Union of Media of Montenegro, with the support of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The claims made in the article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the donor.)